OK, I gave a quick look at it and I think this is what happens.
In both cases, the PDF attack (which I could detect) and the SWF attack (which I cannot detect) do not trigger (I should have a fix for this soon).
Then, in the fuandrenal case, the last page contains the xml data binding exploit, for which we don't have a signature, but which is anomalous enough to make the page suspicious. Hence, the detection. In fact, the last eval block shows:
nextkey = '';
k = '';
attack_level = 0;
followed by the heapspray function, the shellcode, and the xml_bobo function, which launches the exploit.
In the fuck-lady case, the last page does not contain any exploit. Therefore, the page is marked as benign. In fact, the last eval (and, unfortunately, there is a bug that mixes the orders of evals in the report) only contains:
nextkey = '';
k = '';
attack_level = 0;
BTW, interesting encryption scheme to generate the exploit URL...